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Article 8

THE SOBER JOY OF
THIEVING
Jennifer Stob
Radical Prototypes: Allan Kaprow
and the Invention of Happenings by
Judith F. Rodenbeck. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2011. Pp. 312,
47 illustrations. $34.95 cloth,
$17.95 paper.

“The Museum gives us a thieves’
conscience,” begins Judith F.
Rodenbeck’s excellent Radical
Prototypes: Allan Kaprow and
the Invention of Happenings (ii).
The aphorism is from “Indirect
Language and the Voices of
Silence,” one of the central texts that
mark phenomenologist Maurice
Merleau-Ponty’s
engagement
1
with aesthetic theory. Originally
published in 1952 in Les Temps
Modernes, the literary journal synonymous with left-leaning, postwar Continental intellectualism,
Merleau-Ponty’s essay takes issue
with the way our perception of art
is institutionalized.2 He critiques
not only our conventional historical understanding of artistic style
but also the conventional reception
framework that museums offer
us; both, he proclaims, deaden our
experience of artworks and restrict
their ability to truly extend our visible world. The museum in particular disappoints because it too often
serves as a “meditative necropolis”
for artworks rather than a contextual “historicity of life” for them.3 In
their standard form, they compel us
to appraise and consume art retrospectively as a collection of objects,
sculptures, and canvases in artificial communion. We as a society
have invented these museum environments, and therefore our art
viewing is tainted by this act of
stealing artworks from artists and
from their naturally evolving context. Merleau-Ponty suggests that,
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paradoxically, the very museums
we visit with “a somewhat spurious
reverence” inevitably produce in us
a “thieves’ conscience.”4
Radical
Prototypes
turns
Merleau-Ponty’s dictum on its head.
Rodenbeck evokes it conventionally in her first chapter, describing
the guilty conscience that accompanies her own art history of an artistic practice as ephemeral, marginal,
and resistant to institutional display
as happenings. Conceived by artist
Allan Kaprow in 1958, happenings
were a kind of performance art
that resisted theatrical performativity and sought instead to blur the
definitional boundaries between
creator, performer, spectator, and
participant. Carefully organized
and scored, happenings were nevertheless nonnarrative events;
throughout the 1960s, Kaprow
and others depended increasingly
on improvisation and the unexpected as key factors of this process-
oriented, open art form. Perhaps
to spite this guilty conscience,
Rodenbeck refashions the meaning of Merleau-Ponty’s dictum in
the six chapters that follow, using
this appropriation to frame her
discussion of an entirely different
relationship between art and theft
in the 1960s. The book positions
artist Allan Kaprow and those who
took up the artistic practice of happenings he pioneered as exemplars
of an artistic thieves’ conscience in
action. Happenings arose out of a
keen interest in reconstituting some
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of the formal, artifactual evidence
left by the 1920s avant-gardes. In
its failure or its success, this figurative reconstitution was a base
from which artists like Kaprow,
Jim Dine, Claes Oldenburg, Robert
Whitman, and Red Grooms could
depart in the elaboration of their
own artistic projects. Stripped of
Merleau-Ponty’s moralizing overtone, the guiding thieves’ conscience that Rodenbeck locates in
happenings inflected this collageinspired performance paradigm
with multiplicity instead of duplicity, subversion instead of guilt, and
transparency instead of secrecy.
Happenings are positioned as a
kind of transitional aesthetic thievery. They occupy the definitional
boundary between modernist
détournement (a politicized practice
of appropriation) and neutral postmodernist pastiche.
With her narrative, Rodenbeck
deliberately sidesteps the dualism
of formalism and the avant-garde
that has dominated many of the art
historical narratives of the 1960s.
If happenings are best characterized as intermediary, open-ended,
relational, and interdisciplinary,
then their historicization would
do well to reflect this, she reasons.
Her book calls for and models a
scholarly “matrix through which to
approach a generation of postwar
artistic efforts” (27). Her contribution lies in a series of individual
“material, rhetorical, and discursive” histories (18) that enhance our
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understanding of what happenings
were and what they aspired to be.
The wealth of material on the sociological climates, the architectural
practices, the technological metaphors, the theatrical methodologies,
and the photographic conditions
that surrounded happenings acts
like connective tissue, shaping and
securing them within art history.
In this sense, then, the art historical matrix to which Rodenbeck
contributes should be thought of
as a sort of expanded field for happenings where the artworks of
Kaprow and company are no longer contrasted with painting alone
but with all other experimental
intermedia and the areas of inquiry
intermedia shares: the everyday,
the aleatory, and the participatory.
Measured and formal in tone,
preeminently readable at the same
time, Rodenbeck’s book is often like
an unexpected treasure hunt amidst
the presumed familiar. “Let’s look
for traces of civilization!” the trio
in François Truffaut’s Jules et Jim
(1962) exclaim delightedly to one
another as they wander through a
wooded area to the beach. Readers
of Rodenbeck’s histories are led
to wander, too, finding known
documents, theories, and artworks
linked freshly and illuminatingly to one another. The chapters
“Creative Acts of Consumption, or
Death in Venice” and “The Black
Box” are in this sense exemplary.
The former features an impressive
synopsis of the activities and aims
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of the International Congresses
of Modern Architecture (CIAM).
This, along with a discussion of
the work of sociologist David
Riesman, helps articulate the
space—“purposive though almost
aimless” (63), as Kaprow wrote in
1967—that a cluster of happenings activated in the early 1960s:
Oldenburg’s The Store (1961),
Gerhard Richter and Konrad
Lueg’s Leben mit Pop (Living
with pop, 1963), and Kaprow’s
Bon Marché (1963). In the latter
chapter, the infamous black box
of both contemporary theater and
complex electronics is brilliantly
posited as a metaphoric “overdetermined bachelor machine” (80)
for artists involved with happenings, minimalism, and Fluxus (an
international network of artists
united by their interest in chance,
live performance, and collaborative
projects in the early 1960s through
the 1970s). It provided a site of phenomenological exploration where
blank surface, technological construction, and existential interior
could be triangulated.
Perhaps because of the very lack
to which it points, “Generation
Gaps,” the first chapter of Radical
Prototypes, is the book’s most modest offering: it extends the preface,
giving an overview of the lacunae
in art history after 1945 that contribute to our presently limited
understanding of happenings. Art
historians don’t know the particulars of the passage from neo-Dada

22/09/15 10:07 AM

154

Jennifer Stob

to pop to minimalism to intermedia, and although privileged cultural moments are attributed to
conceptual art, performance art,
and photography, practically no
scholarship speaks knowledgeably
to their prehistories (5–6). Theorists
like Guy Debord and Herbert
Marcuse must have been impactful
on American intermedia artists, but
we can’t specifically trace how, and
the secondary theoretical discourses
thus far developed to examine art
of the 1960s (psychoanalytic theory
among them) don’t seem sufficient
to contextualize happenings (7, 22).
These observations speak to the
necessity of the contingent project
of constructing an art historical
matrix rather than a genealogical
tree or flowchart. While the gaps
Rodenbeck identifies won’t ever
be hermetically sealed—nor could
they be—contemporary art historians continue to introduce critical missing knowledge to the field
(subjective testimonies, painstakingly researched exhibition histories, archive-supported time lines,
and even rigorous formal analyses) as affixed nodes upon which a
matrix like Rodenbeck’s can be further extended.
Radical Prototypes assumes a
solid knowledge of the American
art world in the 1960s; it takes as
its point of departure the basic
descriptive material on happenings provided in texts by Kaprow,
like Assemblage, Environments &
Happenings (1966) and Essays on
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the Blurring of Art and Life (1993),
as well as secondary literature like
Childsplay: The Art of Allan Kaprow
(2004) and Allan Kaprow—Art
as Life (2008).5 Rodenbeck often
provides exceptionally helpful
background information omitted in these former works. For
example, she carefully discusses
John Dewey’s pragmatism and
reads the paradigm of happenings
against Fluxus pieces. In some
chapters, however, readers would
benefit from even more recap
of constitutive artistic elements,
especially in cases where images
are reproduced but not directly
referenced or contextualized.
Nevertheless, the advantages of
this approach are clear, affording
Rodenbeck ample space in which
to thoroughly explore the contrast
between Judith Malina and Julian
Beck’s Living Theatre and happenings (“Madness and Method”)
and the antinomies of happenings
that took indexical mediation as
a key performance motif (“Car
Crash, 1960” and “Foil”).
As the book’s title suggests,
Allan Kaprow conceived of happenings as radical prototypes:
radical in the critique that their
frequently destabilizing, negative,
or ambivalent model of subjectivity
and society contained, and prototypical in the enormous influence
they have exercised on more contemporary artistic paradigms such
as installation art, performance art,
and relational art (xi). The radical
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and prototypical nature of happenings has crossed over into contemporary popular culture as slang and
has been mediatized through film,
television, and pop fiction. The
forms of resistance built into happenings (resistance “to documentation, to memory, to the market,
and even to their own codification”
[ix]) have too long been neglected
or misinterpreted by art historians
and curators. Rodenbeck’s book
redresses this. While never accusatory, the final chapter of Radical
Prototypes, entitled “Participation,”
gestures meaningfully in the direction of curator, art critic, and art
administrator Nicolas Bourriaud.
Bourriaud introduced his curatorial concept of relational aesthetics
to art criticism with his collection of
essays entitled Relational Aesthetics,
published in English translation in
1998.6 Relational Aesthetics generated well-deserved controversy in
the 2000s on several counts. Several
art historians (Claire Bishop chief
among them) noted Bourriaud’s
problematic disinterest in historicizing the contemporary art that he
claims makes use of social relations
as its fundamental medium. This
disinterest is likely the cause of his
oversight of important dynamics
of agency and power within such
artworks. Finally, many critics
objected to Bourriaud’s suggestion that relational art offers us an
“interstice” in the Marxian sense (an
enclave or zone of exception from
our dominant economic system
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and the social relations it conditions).7 Rodenbeck concurs with
the critiques leveled at Relational
Aesthetics, calling Bourriaud’s
assignation of what is relational
in art a “self-ratifying tautology”
(252). More compellingly, she raises
the question of why Bourriaud’s
narrative elides artworks of the
1960s, such as happenings, in favor
of 1990s artworks.
According to Rodenbeck, the
answer should be sought in the
careful differentiation of what
participation can actually mean.
The participation solicited in happenings is synonymous with what
Umberto Eco in his 1962 text
The Open Work termed an “oriented insertion” (248). Relational
Aesthetics, on the other hand,
describes artworks that certainly
allow spectators to participate
with their bodies and minds, but
not, ultimately, to potentially recode and reconfigure the work the
way an oriented insertion would.
Bourriaud, as well as his critics,
mostly leave the relational art avant
la lettre of the 1960s aside when
debating what art of the 1990s
can or cannot contestationally do.
In this sense, both sides may have
missed the nuances of this earlier
art’s contestational desires. These
nuances are crucial: Rodenbeck
claims that happenings and their
participants performed the very
doubt that art could continue to
bring a social interstice like the one
Bourriaud invokes into existence.
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Happenings, she writes, “were
addressed to the vanishing of precisely the possibility of this kind
of experience from the horizon of
perceiving subjects. Indeed, they
were addressed to the obsolescence of this experience’s subject”
(245). As radical prototypes, they
resisted commemoration and
institutionalization, but darkly:
Kaprow was aware of happenings’ inability to resist the larger
triad of culture industry, capitalism, and mediation in such a way
that would have taken happenings
out of an aesthetic framework and
aligned them with the situations
of the leftist postwar avant-garde,
the Situationist International. In
Rodenbeck’s reading, Kaprow
and other practitioners of happenings could only agree with the
Situationists’ appraisal of their art.
Happenings, the Situationists wrote
in 1963, are “an isolated attempt to
construct a situation on the basis of
poverty (material poverty, poverty
of human contact, poverty inherited from the artistic spectacle,
poverty of the specific philosophy
driven to ‘ideologize’ the reality of
these moments).”8
Having charted the transitions of happenings—Kaprow’s
and others—Rodenbeck’s book
finishes with the thought that, in
them, we see experience affirmed
as “an act of attention” (245). This
is once again a celebration of the
appropriated thieves’ conscience
in art that inspired a redescription
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and rearticulation of conventional
society in the 1960s. Indeed, this
is exactly what creates the contextual historicity of life that MerleauPonty longs for in his 1952 text.
He laments our museumgoing
with thieves’ consciences, suggesting we should instead go “in the
sober joy of work,”9 as painters do.
Rodenbeck’s book is an important
contribution to the larger historical
project that reminds us that artistic
thieving, redescribing, and rearticulating in the name of social critique are themselves sober joys.
Jennifer Stob is assistant professor of art
history in the School of Art and Design at
Texas State University. Her scholarship
focuses on the intersection of contemporary
art, experimental cinema and artists’
video, particularly the place of film in the
Situationist International and the Austria
Filmmaker’s Cooperative. Her work has
been published in Evental Aesthetics,
Moving Image Review and Art Journal
(MIRAJ), Parallax, and Studies in French
Cinema.
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